One year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the surprise is not how much has changed in the financial industry, but how little.
Backstopped by huge federal guarantees, the
biggest banks have restructured only around
the edges. Employment in the industry has
fallen just 8 percent since last September.
Only a handful of big hedge funds have
closed. Pay is already returning to precrash
levels, topped by the 30,000 employees of
Goldman Sachs, who are on track to earn an
average of $700,000 this year. Nor are major
pay cuts likely, according to a report last
week from J.P. Morgan Securities. Executives
at most big banks have kept their jobs.
Financial stocks have soared since their
winter lows.
The Obama administration has proposed
regulatory changes, but even their backers
say they face a difficult road in Congress.
For
now, banks still sell and trade unregulated
derivatives, despite their role in last
fall’s chaos. Radical changes like pay caps
or restrictions on bank size face
overwhelming resistance. Even minor changes,
like requiring banks to disclose more about
the derivatives they own, are far from
certain.
Coming on the same weekend as the 11th-hour
bailout of the giant insurer American
International Group, and the sale of Merrill
Lynch, Lehman’s failure was the climax of a
cataclysmic weekend in the financial
industry. In the days that followed, nearly
everyone seemed to agree that Wall Street
was due for fundamental change. Its “heads I
win, tails I’m bailed out” model could not
continue. Its eight-figure paydays would
end.
In fact, though, regulators and lawmakers
have spent most of the last year trying to
save the financial industry, rather than
transform it. In the short run, their
efforts have succeeded. Citigroup and other
wounded banks have avoided bankruptcy, and
the economy has sidestepped a depression.
But the same investors and economists who
predicted, and in some cases profited from,
the collapse last fall say the rescue has
come at an extraordinary cost. They warn
that if the industry’s systemic risks are
not addressed, they could cause an even
bigger crisis — in years, not decades. Next
time, they say, the credit of the United
States government may be at risk.
Simon Johnson, a professor at the Sloan
School of Management at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and former chief
economist of the International Monetary
Fund, said that the seeds of another
collapse had already sprouted. If major
banks are allowed to keep making bets that
are ultimately backed by taxpayer
guarantees, they will return to the
practices that led them to underwrite
trillions of dollars in bad loans, Professor
Johnson said.
“They will run up big risks, they will fail
again, they will hit us for a big check,” he
predicted.
The doomsday view is far from universal.
Wall Street executives say the Lehman
bankruptcy opened their eyes to the
fragility of their institutions. They note
that they have pulled back on risk and
reduced leverage, creating a bigger cushion
against losses. And they say that regulators
were right to support the financial industry
over the last year, rather than imposing new
rules or allowing weak banks to collapse.
“There is less leverage in the entire
financial system,” said David A. Viniar,
Goldman’s chief financial officer. At
Goldman, $1 in capital now supports about
$14 in loans and investments, compared with
$24 a year ago.
But
even some senior Wall Street executives
acknowledge the lack of change surprises
them, given how poorly the industry
performed last fall and the degree of
government support necessary to keep it from
collapsing.
“There was a general feeling that an
enormous amount of additional regulation
should be put in place to prevent what
happened that weekend from happening again,”
said Byron Wien, vice chairman of Blackstone
Advisory Services and the former chief
investment strategist for Morgan Stanley and
Pequot Capital. “So far, we haven’t seen a
lot of action.”
Robert J. Shiller, the Yale University
economics professor who predicted the
dot-com crash and the housing bust, said the
window for change may be closing. “People
will accept change at a time of crisis, but
we haven’t managed to do much, and maybe
complacency is coming back,” Professor
Shiller said. “We seem to be losing
momentum.”
Kenneth C. Griffin, founder and chief
executive of the Citadel Investment Group, a
Chicago-based hedge fund that manages $13
billion, said that regulators and lawmakers
needed to impose rules so failing banks
could be shut, rather than allowed to
operate indefinitely with taxpayer support.
“We’ve taken a lot of steps for the worse,
and not for the better, in terms of the
structural underpinnings of our capital
markets,” Mr. Griffin said. “We have to
change the rules and correct the fundamental
flaws in the financial system.”
To be sure, Wall Street is not exactly as it
was before the cataclysm of last year.
Then, a dozen or so big banks formed the top
tier. Now Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase
are clearly the strongest, with Morgan
Stanley struggling to compete. Bank of
America and Citigroup are the weakest big
banks, heavily reliant on government
guarantees to survive.
“We have more separation between the
healthiest and the least healthy of the big
banks,” said Darrell Duffie, a finance
professor at Stanford University.
Banks have collectively raised hundreds of
billions in new capital to help cushion
losses on bad loans and are taking a more
prudent approach to lending and
underwriting. The worst excesses of 2006 and
2007, when banks lent hundreds of billions
of dollars against all kinds of real estate
at terms that even at the time seemed
absurd, have ended.
But those changes are not unexpected. Banks
typically raise lending standards during
recessions. And even if they wanted to keep
up underwriting, they would not find much of
a market. Many pension and hedge funds have
suffered huge losses on mortgage-backed
bonds and are hardly rushing to buy more.
Critics
of the industry argue that the pullback in
risk will be only temporary without deep
regulatory changes. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a
statistician, trader, and author, has argued
for years that financial firms chronically
underestimate their risks and must be
managed much more cautiously. Universa
Investments, a $5 billion fund in which he
is a principal, made more than 100 percent
profit last year betting on the possibility
of a collapse.
Mr.
Taleb warns that the system has grown
riskier since last fall. The extensive
government support that began after Lehman
collapsed will lead investors to assume that
governments will always prevent major banks
from collapsing, he said.
So investors will lend money to the
financial industry on easy terms. In turn,
financial institutions will use that cheap
money to make risky loans and trades. The
banks will keep the profits when their bets
pay off, while taxpayers will swallow the
losses when the bets go bad and threaten the
system.
Economists call the phenomenon moral hazard.
Bankers have a different term: I.B.G. The
phrase implies that by the time a deal goes
sour, “I’ll be gone,” after having received
a sizable bonus.
Despite the predictions last year about pay
cuts, those bonuses appear secure. Kian
Abouhossein, an analyst at J.P. Morgan in
London, predicted this week that eight major
American and European banks would pay the
141,000 employees in their investment
banking units $77 billion in 2011 — about
$543,000 per worker, not far from the 2007
peak — even after minor regulatory changes
are adopted.
Because the rewards are so rich, the banks
will not change unless regulators and
lawmakers force them, Mr. Taleb said.
“I
don’t know anyone on Wall Street who goes to
work every day thinking of anything but how
to increase their bonus,” he said.
To prevent a replay of last year’s crisis,
investors in financial institutions,
especially bondholders, must believe that
they will lose money if banks fail, said
Sheila C. Bair, the chairwoman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. “You
need to send that very strong, clear signal
to restore market discipline,” Ms. Bair
said.
But legislation that would allow regulators
to close giant institutions in an orderly
fashion has been stalled for months. So too
have efforts to create a systemic regulator
that would focus on the broader risk that
might occur from the ripple effects caused
by the failure of one major bank.
Another proposed change would require banks
to list and trade derivatives through a
central clearinghouse, just as stocks and
options are traded through exchanges, but it
has yet to go anywhere.
The term derivatives encompasses a variety
of financial products, including contracts
whose value changes as interest rates move
and insurance that pays off if a bond
defaults. Derivatives drove the boom before
2008 by encouraging banks to make loans
without adequate reserves. They also
worsened the panic last fall because they
inherently tie institutions together.
Investors worried that the collapse of one
bank would lead to big losses at others.
Requiring that derivatives be traded openly
sounds like a relatively small change, but
it could have important effects.
Exchange trading would open pricing for
derivatives, so banks could not hide
money-losing positions. Banks would have to
put up money as positions moved against
them, since the exchanges would seize and
sell derivatives that were not backed by
adequate margin. That move would help avoid
the situation A.I.G. faced last year, after
it wrote hundreds of billions of dollars of
credit insurance and had no money to make
good on its promises when the bonds
defaulted. But critics say that even
the proposed changes would not go far
enough, because they would exempt some
complex derivatives from exchange trading or
clearing. Moreover, some banks oppose
opening derivatives trading, because it
would cut their profits by making pricing
more visible and as a consequence
competitive. For now, legislation to force
derivatives trading onto exchanges has
stalled, and banks are still writing
contracts with limited regulatory oversight.
“The off-exchange derivatives market is
still the Wild West,” Ms. Bair said.
