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While Tibet raises a number
of controversial questions, one dimension will assume increasing
political significance: its water resources.
The Tibetan Plateau, known to many as the "Third Pole," is an
enormous storehouse of freshwater, believed by some to be the
world's largest. It is the headwaters of many of Asia's mighty
rivers, including the Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, Salween, Brahmaputra,
Indus and Sutlej. These vast water resources are of course
vulnerable to environmental challenges, including climate change,
but they are subject to an array of political issues as well.
Should China be the lone stakeholder to the fate of the waters in
Tibet?
What happens in the downstream nations that depend heavily on these
rivers?
China has exploited all but two rivers from the Tibetan Plateau; an
exception is the Nujiang River, which flows through Yunnan province
and enters Burma, where it is known as the Salween.
China's north-south diversion plans on the Yarlung Zangbo (known in
India as Brahamaputra), the other untouched river, are bound to
worry India, a downstream state.
China's rise in recent years has been displayed in military
capability, economic pace and, now, water diversions.
By 2030, China is expected to fall short of its water demands by 25
percent.
Its increasingly aggressive hydrobehavior is intended to secure its
massive water requirements in its northern and western regions.
But control over such a valuable natural resource gives Beijing
enormous strategic latitude with its neighbors; when one of those
countries is a rival, such as India, it becomes an effective
bargaining tool and potential weapon.
Chinese nationalism is based on its aspiration of great-power status
and its historic territorial claims.
Such claims, for example, over Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh, a state
in northeast India, are being driven by China's water needs. Mao
Zedong observed in 1952, "The south has a lot of water, the north
little. . . . If possible, it is ok to lend a little water." China
is looking to exploit the water resources of Tibet and its hardening
position on Arunachal --
Beijing considers the northeast Indian state part of its territory
and made frequent military forays there this year -- is not merely
rhetoric.
In laying claims to
Arunachal, it is claiming almost 200 million cubic feet per second
of water resources in the state.
China, well-accustomed to brinkmanship, is likely to maintain a
strategic silence on its river diversion plans, to keep downstream
states guessing.
(China denies any activity on the Yarlung Zangbo, but publicly
reported satellite imagery shows otherwise.)
And with no legally binding international treaty on such
water-sharing, there is nothing to stop China from manipulating
river flows and increasing downstream dependency.
More than 2 billion people in South and Southeast Asia depend on the
waters flowing out of Tibet. Building a lower riparian coalition of,
say, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Burma, Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam would help cement recognition of Tibet's water
as a common resource.
India has a diplomatic opportunity here and, given its downriver
position, needs to take the initiative.
One plus is that India has
experience dealing with river treaties.
But Tibet's unresolved
political status will affect any proposals on how to sustainably
manage its water resources and ensure its rivers' natural flow are
not disturbed by Chinese diversion plans.
China's moves to encroach on Tibet's water need to be
countered by downriver solidarity that includes agreement on
multipurpose beneficial use of these resources.
Downriver states need to
work through legal norms of equitable utilization, "no-harm"
policies and restricted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.
This pressure and
international attention to defining such vital resources as common
would go a long way toward preserving and sharing the waters of
Tibet.
While such redefinition is politically sensitive, as it clashes with
national jurisdiction, it merits attention now given the current and
future water requirements of South and Southeast Asia.
Collective political and diplomatic pressure over a sustained
period will be needed to draw in China to regional arrangements on
"reasonable share of water" and frame treaties accordingly.
The concerned downstream states need to raise the issue
internationally while also supporting local Tibetans and Chinese
environmental lobbies' efforts to highlight the rampant ecological
destruction of Tibet brought by dams and artificial diversion plans.
A larger debate on basin
resource management is needed.
It is increasingly clear
that rivers are not merely for water provisions but also have
ecological functions.
One need only look at
China's Yangtze and Yellow rivers, both unfit for human use, to
understand how important it is to follow the laws of nature
regarding Tibet's waters rather than force economic development.
Uttam Kumar Sinha is a research fellow at the nonpartisan Institute
for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi.
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