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United States
District Court, N.D. Florida,
Pensacola Division.
DESIGN-BUILD CONCEPTS, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
JENKINS BRICK COMPANY, and Continental Cast Stone Manufacturing, Inc.,
Defendants.
Jenkins Brick Company, Crossclaim Plaintiff,
v.
Continental Cast Stone Manufacturing, Inc., Crossclaim Defendant.
No. 3:06cv558/MCR/MD.
March 10, 2008.
ORDER
M. CASEY RODGERS, District Judge.
This action arises out of a dispute concerning the quality and timeliness of
cast stone pieces manufactured by the Defendant/Cross claim Defendant Continental
Cast Stone Manufacturing, Inc. (“Continental”) for use in the construction of a
bank in Crestview, Florida. Pending before the court are Continental's Motions
to Dismiss Counts Six through Ten of Plaintiff Design-Build Concepts, Inc.'s
(“Design-Build”) Amended Complaint and Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff Jenkins
Brick Company's (“Jenkins”) Crossclaim for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (Docs. 54 and 57).FN1 The
court has reviewed the record, including the affidavits and evidence filed by
the parties, as well as the applicable law. For the reasons that follow,
Continental's motions to dismiss will be DENIED.
FN1. In its Amended Complaint, Design-Build brings claims against Jenkins for
breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
and negligent misrepresentation (Counts One through Five). (Doc. 51). It also
brings claims against Continental for breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, negligence, and as a third-party beneficiary for breach of
contract (Counts Six through Ten).Id. In response to Design-Build's Amended
Complaint, Jenkins filed a Crossclaim against Continental for contribution,
indemnity, breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. (Doc. 52).
Background FN2
FN2. The factual background is taken from Design-Build's Amended Complaint and
Jenkins' Cross claim to the extent the facts are not contradicted by
Continental's jurisdictional affidavit filed in support of its pending motions
to dismiss.
Design-Build is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in
Georgia.FN3Design-Build is authorized to and does conduct business in Florida.
Design-Build is in the business of design-build construction. Jenkins is an
Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in Alabama.FN4 Jenkins
is authorized to and does conduct business in Florida. Jenkins manufactures
brick and other masonry construction products. Continental is a Kansas
corporation with its principal place of business in Shawnee, Kansas. Continental
manufactures and distributes cast stone products. Continental is not registered
to do business in Florida.
FN3. The record does not indicate the city in Georgia where Design-Build's
principal office is located.
FN4. The record does not indicate the city in Alabama where Jenkins' principal
office is located.
Design-Build entered into a construction contract with the First National Bank
of Crestview, Florida (“Bank”) on or about December 16, 2002, for the design and
construction of a new office building in Crestview, Okaloosa County, Florida
(“the Crestview project” or “the project”). The design developed by Design-Build
for this project included the use of cast stone block in various parts of the
bank. On or about May 25, 2004, Design-Build and Jenkins entered into a purchase
order contract in which Jenkins agreed to supply masonry materials for the
project, including all of the pieces of cast stone block (“the cast stone
pieces”). This contract set forth specifications for the various cast stone
pieces and required that deliveries of the cast stone to the project start no
later than August 9, 2004. Jenkins then entered into a separate contract with
Continental for the manufacture and delivery of all the cast stone pieces needed
for the project. The cast stone was to conform to the specifications, standards,
and scheduling requirements set forth in the contract between Design-Build and
Jenkins.
Design-Build alleges that Jenkins and Continental failed to deliver the cast
stone pieces within the time frames required by Design-Build's contract with
Jenkins. According to Design-Build, the first cast stone was not delivered until
October 2004 and delivery of all pieces was not complete until November 2005.
Design-Build also alleges that Continental failed to supply the cast stone
pieces in the sequence required to support construction. Finally, Design-Build
alleges that the cast stone pieces that were delivered had manufacturing defects
including improper sizing and dimensions, chips and cracks, and improper
anchorages.
Legal Standards
A federal district court sitting in diversity “may exercise personal
jurisdiction to the extent authorized by the law of the state in which it sits
and to the extent allowed under the Constitution.”Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun
Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir.2002). Thus, in deciding
whether it may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a federal
district court in Florida must first “determine whether the Florida long-arm
statute provides a basis for personal jurisdiction. If so, then [it] must
determine whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between the defendants and
the forum state so as to satisfy ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ “
Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir.1996)
(citing Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F3d 253, 256 (11th 1996)); SEC v.
Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir.1997).
Florida's long-arm statute authorizes courts to exercise specific jurisdiction
pursuant to Fla. Sta. § 48.193(1) and general jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Sta.
§ 48.193(2).Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 n. 7 (11th Cir.1990). A court
may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the
plaintiff's cause of action arises from or is directly related to a defendant's
contacts with the forum state. Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace
Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 n. 3 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Consolidated Dev. Corp.
v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir.2000)).
Specific jurisdiction
requires some “direct affiliation, nexus, or substantial connection between the
cause of action and the [defendant's] activities within the state.”FN5 Sun Trust
Bank v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 184 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1269 (S.D.Fla.2001) (quoting
Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine) Ltd. v. J.R. Charman, 635 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
FN5. This requirement is often referred to as “connexity.” Sun Trust Bank v. Sun
Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 184 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1270 (S.D.Fla.2001) (citing Bloom v.
A.H. Pond Co., Inc., 519 F.Supp. 1162, 1168 (S.D.Fla.1981)).
A court may exercise general jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(2) when the suit
does not arise out of the nonresident's contacts with Florida provided the
nonresident is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity in the
state.FN6Stubbs, 447 F.3d at 1360 n. 3 (citing Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269);see Fla.
Sta. § 48.193(2). Florida courts have interpreted “substantial and not isolated
activity” to mean “continuous and systematic general business
contact.”Autonation, Inc. v. Whitlock, 276 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1262 (S.D.Fla.2003)
(citing Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
These contacts must show a “general course of business activity in the State for
pecuniary benefit.”Stubbs, 447 F.3d at 1361 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Although this is similar to the contact requirement for carrying
on a business or business venture under § 48.193(1)(a), for general jurisdiction
to attach a defendant's business contacts with the forum “must be especially
pervasive and substantial .... “ General Cigar Holdings, Inc. v.. Altadis, S.A.,
205 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1343 (S.D.Fla.2002).
FN6. Section 48.193(2) provides that a nonresident who has “engaged in
substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity
is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that
activity.”Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2).
Once the court has determined that jurisdiction over a nonresident defendants
exists under the long-arm statute, it has to then decide whether it can exercise
that jurisdiction under the Constitution. This inquiry, which is primarily
concerned with matters of due process, asks first whether the defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the state such that he should reasonably
anticipate being sued there, Achievers Unlimited, Inc. v. Nutri Herb, Inc., 710
So.2d 716, 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and second, whether it is fair to require
the defendant to defend the suit in the forum state. See Posner v. Essex Ins.
Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1221 (11th Cir.1999) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). The
minimum contacts requirement is satisfied if the defendant “purposefully directs
activities at Florida and litigation arises out of those activities, or the
defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state.”FN7Achievers Unlimited, Inc., 710 So.2d at 719. Finally,
“[o]nce it has been determined that the nonresident defendant has purposefully
established minimum contacts with the forum ... these contacts are considered in
light of other factors to decide whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ “ Madara, 916 F.2d at
1517 (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85
L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)).
FN7. The “continuous and systematic” contacts requirement for general
jurisdiction is so demanding that if the defendant's activities meet the
statutory requirements of § 48.193(2), the minimum contacts due process standard
is also satisfied. Woods, 739 So.2d at 620. Accordingly, a court need not
conduct a separate minimum contacts analysis for purposes of general
jurisdiction.
Discussion
A. Long-Arm Jurisdiction
Specific Jurisdiction under Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(a)-Conducting
a Business
Where a defendant's business activities are concerned, specific jurisdiction
will attach provided the defendant is carrying on a business or business venture
in Florida either itself or through an agent. See § 48.193(1)(a).FN8 In such
instances the defendant's activities “considered collectively ... [must] show a
general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary
benefit.”Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 627 (quoting Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal
Assocs. Inc., 314 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A “business venture” generally concerns one subject matter or undertaking while
“business” generally is “broader in scope denoting a variety of subjects,
transactions or undertakings.”Suffolk Fed. Credit Union v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 664
So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (quoting Matthews v. Matthews, 122 So.2d
571, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “a single
project or transaction” may be sufficient to constitute a “business venture” and
satisfy the requirements of the long-arm statute. Atlantis Marina & Yacht Club,
Inc. v. R & R Holdings, Inc., 766 So.2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (citing
Suffolk, 664 So.2d at 1154).
FN8.Section 48.193(1)(a) provides that jurisdiction over a nonresident exists if
the nonresident is “operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a
business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this
state ....“ Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a).
In Design-Build's Amended Complaint and Jenkins' Crossclaim, the parties allege
that “Continental does business throughout the United States, including in the
state of Florida.”See docs. 51 ¶ 3 and 52 ¶ 3. In addition, Design-Build alleges
that while Continental is not registered to do business in Florida, it continues
to sell its products in the state. See doc. 51 ¶ 3. Further, Jenkins alleges
that “Continental conducted business in the state of Florida by contracting to
manufacture, supply, and deliver cast stone pieces to the Design-Build
construction project” and that “Continental conducts and continues to conduct
business in the state of Florida.”See doc. 52 ¶¶ 8, 10. In response, Continental
submitted the affidavit of James Mulaney, its Chief Financial Officer, in which
he states that Continental does not own or lease any property in Florida, nor
does it have employees or agents residing in Florida, nor does it have or
operate an office in Florida. Mulaney further states that Continental did not
solicit the work at issue in this case. Mulaney, however, does not contest
Design-Build and Jenkins' allegations that Continental conducts business in
Florida or that it continues to sell its products in the state.FN9
FN9. Because Mulaney failed to respond to these allegations, the court accepts
them as true. See Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514 (citing Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d
489, 492 (11th Cir.1988)).
Based on the totality of evidence in the record, the court concludes that
Continental's involvement with the Crestview project constituted conducting a
business venture in the state of Florida for pecuniary benefit under §
48.193(1)(a). Continental entered into a contract for the manufacture of cast
stone pieces, knowing that these pieces were intended for use in a construction
project in Florida. The contract required Continental to deliver the cast stone
pieces to Florida. The contract also provided that Continental would be paid
$227,500 for its work. During the course of its contract, Continental sent shop
drawings of the proposed cast stone pieces to Design-Build at the Crestview site
in Florida. See, e.g., Empire Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 695 So.2d 919, 920-21
(Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (finding specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a) was
appropriate in part because defendant sent artwork of the proposed product to
plaintiff in Florida for approval). Moreover, these shop drawings, as well as
other product submissions prepared by Continental, identified a specific
manufacture and delivery sequence including at least five separate phases of
cast stone pieces for purposes of manufacture, delivery, and installation.
Continental then proceeded to make in excess of forty deliveries of cast stone
pieces to the Crestview site from October 2004 through November 2005. See, e.g.,
Control Laser Corp. v. Rocky Mountain Instrument Co., 130 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1346
(M.D.Fla.2000) (finding specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a) was
appropriate in part because defendant contracted to deliver a finished product
to a Florida resident in Florida); Pollution Prevention Servs., Inc. v. Inter
Recycling, Inc., 1996 WL 378990 *3 (M.D.Fla. July 1, 1996) (same). Each delivery
included a shipping memo prepared by Continental setting forth which cast stone
pieces were being delivered and identifying the destination of the shipment as
Crestview, Florida. The shipping memos further stated that invoices for the
delivered cast stone pieces were to be sent to Jenkins' office in Pensacola,
Florida.
When problems arose with the timeliness and quality of Continental's cast stone
pieces, Continental became even more involved in the Crestview project. Stephen
Gray Allison, Design-Build's project manager for the project, stated that during
the time the cast stone pieces were being delivered and installed he had almost
daily conversations about these problems from his location at the Crestview
project with Continental representatives in either Continental's corporate
office in Kansas or its manufacturing facility in Savannah, Georgia. See, e.g.,
Clover Sys., Inc. v. Almagran, S.A., 2007 WL 1655377 *4 (S.D.Fla. June 7, 2007)
(finding specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a) was appropriate in part
because defendant exchanged numerous communications with the Florida plaintiff);
Citicorp, 635 So.2d at 81 (same). Continental responded to Design-Build's
concerns by sending various representatives to the Crestview site, including
Continental's General Manager for the Savannah fabrication facility on three or
four occasions, Continental's Savannah factory production manager at least once,
and Continental's Regional Vice President on approximately three occasions. See,
e.g., Clover Sys ., 2007 WL 1655377 at *4 (finding specific jurisdiction under §
48.193(1)(a) was appropriate in part because defendant made regular trips to
Florida to negotiate and facilitate the business relationship with the
plaintiff); Empire, 695 So.2d. at 920-21 (same). Continental also sent one of
its employees, a “patch and finish” technician, to the site on multiple
occasions to repair and perform remedial work. Finally, after substantially all
of the cast stone pieces had been delivered, Continental sent an entire crew to
the Crestview site to perform further remedial and patch work. This crew
remained on site for three to four weeks. These facts establish personal
jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a).FN10
FN10. The “connexity” requirement for exercising specific jurisdiction is
satisfied because each cause of action in this case “arises from” Continental's
alleged failure to deliver the cast stone pieces, which were the subject of this
business venture, in a timely manner and free of defects. See Sun Trust Bank,
184 F.Supp.2d at 1269 (quoting Citicorp, 635 So.2d at 81 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
2. Specific Jurisdiction under Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(g)-Breaching a
Contract
Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(g) allows courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who breaches a contract in Florida by failing to
“perform acts required by the contract to be performed in Florida.”Sculptchair,
94 F.3d at 629. Continental's contract with Jenkins required it to deliver to
Florida cast stone pieces that conformed to the specifications, standards, and
scheduling requirements stated in Jenkins' contract with Design-Build. Thus,
accepting Continental's allegations as true, by failing to deliver non-defective
goods to the Crestview, Florida site, Continental breached the contract. See,
e.g., Advanced Bodycare Solutions LLC v. Thione Int'l, Inc., 514 F.Supp.2d 1326,
1330 (S.D.Fla.2007) (finding specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(g) was
appropriate where delivery of the subject product was to be in Florida, in
conformity with certain specifications and without defect, and defendant
allegedly failed to deliver conforming, non-defective products); Control Laser,
130 F.Supp.2d at 1346;Pollution Prevention, 1996 WL 378990 at *3. Accordingly,
personal jurisdiction over Continental also exists under § 48.193(1)(g).FN11
FN11. The “connexity” requirement for exercising specific jurisdiction is
satisfied because each cause of action in this case “arises from” Continental's
alleged failure to deliver conforming, non-defective cast stone pieces in
Florida. See Sun Trust Bank, 184 F.Supp.2d at 1269 (quoting Citicorp, 635 So.2d
at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
B. Due Process
The court must next determine whether there are sufficient “minimum contacts”
between Continental and Florida to ensure that maintenance of the suit does not
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”Int'l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316.
1. Minimum Contacts
In a case involving specific jurisdiction, the court must apply a three-part
test to determine whether the minimum contacts requirement is met. Baker
Electronics, Inc. v. Pentar Sys., Inc., 219 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1264 (M.D.Fla.2002)
(citing Response Reward Sys., L.C. v. Meijer, Inc., 189 F.Supp.2d 1332, 1338
(M.D.Fla.2002)). First, to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement the
defendant's contacts with the forum must be related to the plaintiff's cause of
action. Id. Second, these contacts “must involve some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
state.”Id. Third, “the defendant's contacts with the state must be such that the
defendant would reasonably anticipate being haled into court [in Florida].”Id.
In support of its motions to dismiss, Continental argues that it does not have
any significant contacts with the state of Florida, see supra p. 6, and that it
has not purposefully directed its activities at Florida given that all of the
subject cast stone pieces were manufactured in Georgia. While it is true that to
satisfy the minimum contacts requirement there must be more than a general
awareness on the defendant's part that its products would eventually enter the
forum state through the stream of commerce (Asahi Metal Indus., Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94
L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)), in this case, Continental did considerably more than merely
place its cast stone pieces into the stream of commerce. Continental
manufactured the subject cast stone pieces in conformity with the specifications
required for use in the Crestview project and with the understanding that the
cast stone pieces would be used in that project. It then delivered the cast
stone pieces to the Crestview site, as required by its contract with Jenkins, in
over forty extended shipments and sent invoices to Jenkins in Florida.
Continental's cast stone pieces therefore cannot be said to have arrived in and
been used in Florida under “fortuitous” circumstances. Scultpchair, 94 F.3d at
631 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480). Rather, the facts the court cited in
support of its finding that Continental was engaged in a business venture in
Florida also show that Continental had sufficient contacts with Florida such
that it purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within Florida and should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in
this state.FN12
FN12.See, e.g., Advanced, 514 F.Supp.2d at 1331 (finding minimum contacts
requirement was satisfied in part because the defendant intended to and did
deliver its product to Florida and then replaced a portion of that product which
was defective); Baker Electronics, 219 F.Supp.2d at 1264 (finding minimum
contacts requirement was satisfied in part because the defendant traveled to
Florida to further the business venture, delivered three products to Florida,
and transmitted information to the plaintiff in Florida); Control Laser, 130
F.Supp.2d at 1347 (finding minimum contacts requirement was satisfied in part
because the defendant manufactured goods specifically for a Florida plaintiff
and then delivered those goods to Florida); Pollution Prevention, 1996 WL 378990
at *4-5 (finding minimum contacts requirement was satisfied in part because the
defendant delivered a recycling machine to Florida and then sent its employees
to install the machine and subsequently repair the machine); Empire Indus., 695
So.2d at 920-21 (finding minimum contacts requirement was satisfied in part
because the defendant traveled to Florida to negotiate the contract and sent
artwork of the product to Florida for approval); Pace Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Life
Carpet & Tile Co., Inc., 365 So.2d 445, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (finding minimum
contacts requirement was satisfied in part because the defendant, through a
local distributor, agreed to sell and subsequently delivered its product to a
Florida corporation).
Continental also points out that its contract with Jenkins, the only contract
to which Continental is a party in this case, contains a forum selection clause
stating that “[j]urisdiction and venue for any action involving this agreement
shall be in the State Courts of Johnson County, [Kansas].” Continental argues
that based on this forum selection clause it did not purposefully avail itself
of the privilege of doing business in Florida nor was it reasonably foreseeable
that it would be haled into court in Florida in relation to this project.
Continental's dealings, however, were not solely with Jenkins. Design-Build
alleges that Continental made a number of express warranties directly to
Design-Build, sent shop drawings directly to Design-Build, delivered the cast
stone pieces directly to Design-Build, and interacted directly with Design-Build
personnel in patching and repairing the allegedly defective cast stone pieces.
Based on these interactions, Continental purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of doing business in Florida and it could reasonably foresee being
haled into court in Florida by Design-Build . FN13
FN13. The court notes that the terms of a forum selection clause alone are not
dispositive of the question of whether personal jurisdiction exists. See, e.g.,
Four Star Resorts Bahamas, Ltd. v. Allegro Resorts Mgmt. Servs., Ltd., 811 So.2d
809, 810-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (citing McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540
(Fla.1987)).
2. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
In determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, courts should consider
such matters as the burden on the defendant, the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the
several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. See Meier,
288 F.3d at 1276.
Applying these factors, the court finds that its exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Continental does not violate traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. As a threshold matter, the court does not believe this
presents a burden on Continental. Continental found it convenient to send
representatives to Florida to administer this contract. See, e.g., Clover Sys.,
2007 WL 1655377 at *4. Further, to the extent there is a burden, “modern methods
of transportation and communication have significantly alleviated” the burden of
defending oneself in a foreign legal system. Stubbs, 447 F.3d at 1364 (citing
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223
(1957)). Finally, “[w]hen minimum contacts have been established,” as they have
been in this case, “often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum ... will
justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 113. In addition, Florida has a strong interest in adjudicating a dispute
concerning a bank in Florida which would provide financial services to Florida
residents. Finally, it would be inefficient to dismiss the case at this time and
have it brought in another court because significant discovery has already
occurred under the supervision of this court, both Continental and Jenkins have
filed motions for summary judgment that are currently under review by this court
(docs.95, 129, 130), and a jury trial is scheduled in this court for September
15, 2008.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Defendant/Crossclaim Defendant
Continental's Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (docs. 54 and
57) are DENIED.
ORDERED.
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